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This survey covers legislative and judicial developments in Vir-
ginia employment law between June 1986 and June 1987. It does
not address the workers' compensation and unemployment com-
pensation statutes but focuses on state labor and fair employment
laws and the employment-at-will doctrine.
Although federal law is the primary source of labor and fair em-
ployment law,1 remedies available under Virginia common law for
employment-related disputes have expanded, most notably as a re-
sult of the federal courts' recognition of a state contract claim
based on an employer's representations and handbooks. Legislative
developments were relatively sparse in 1987. The only significant
bill enacted affecting the relationship between employers and em-
ployees was the Virginia Human Rights Act.2
I. EMPLOYMENT AT WILL
The Virginia Supreme Court has not considered the issue of
whether policies contained in an employment handbook or an em-
ployer's representations can become enforceable terms of an em-
ployment contract. In the absence of any pronouncement from the
court on this exception to the employment-at-will rule, decisions
from the state circuit courts and the federal courts interpreting
Virginia law varied as to whether an employer's handbooks or rep-
resentations provide the basis for a contract claim.3
* Associate, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Virginia; B.A., 1974, University of Virginia;
M.A., 1979, University of Virginia; J.D., 1983, University of Virginia.
1. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000-e (1982); National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. II 1984); Labor-Management &
Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 135 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-218 (1928 & Supp. III 1985), as
amended by Act of Oct. 16, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-486, 29 U.S.C.A. § 214 (Cum. Supp. 1987);
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31, 42, U.S.C.).
2. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-714 to -725 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
3. For an excellent discussion on the status of the employment-at-will rule in Virginia, see
Marshall & Wicker, The Status of the At-Will Employment Doctrine in Virginia after
Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 267 (1986).
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Two circuit court decisions handed down in October 1986 illus-
trate the diverse views in this area. In Seitz v. Philip Morris, Inc.,4
the plaintiff alleged that his discharge violated the defendant em-
ployer's Policy and Procedure Manual provisions setting "just
cause" as the standard for terminating employment. The circuit
court overruled the employer's demurrer to the breach of contract
claim, holding that the lack of a specific time limit does not mean
that an at-will arrangement exists when an employment contract is
alleged.' Accordingly, the plaintiff could proceed to trial and at-
tempt to prove that the employment manual constitutes a
contract.'
In Moore v. Sadler Materials,7 the plaintiff claimed that his dis-
charge was in breach of an employment contract, based upon the
defendant's employment manual stating that employees would be
fired only for stated reasons constituting good cause. The circuit
court sustained the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the
language in the manual could not be used for purposes of creating
the terms of a contract where the contract provides no definite pe-
riod of time for its duration.
Virginia federal district courts have shown a greater inclination
to allow wrongful discharge claims based on express contracts de-
rived from employer's representations, handbooks and personnel
policies.' These courts have not only accepted the proposition that
an enforceable contract may result from an employer's expression
of personnel policies and procedures, they have applied general
contract principles to modification of these "agreements" as well.
In Thompson v. Kings Entertainment Co.,9 the plaintiff, who
was employed at a theme park, received an employee's manual in
1980 defining dismissal as a separation initiated by the park "for
cause." The park was subsequently sold and the plaintiff's new em-
ployer, Kings Entertainment, gave him an employee's handbook in
4. 6 Va. Cir. 428 (Richmond 1986).
5. Id. at 429-30.
6. At trial, the defendant moved the court to strike the evidence upon conclusion of the
plaintiff's case as to liability. The defendant argued that there was no evidence to go to the
jury and it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court granted defendant's
motion to strike. See Seitz v. Philip Morris, Inc., At Law No. Lk-848-1 (Richmond, July 21,
1987).
7. No. L-3076 (Virginia Beach, Oct. 21, 1986).
8. For a discussion of the major federal court decisions in this area, see Marshall &
Wicker, supra note 3, at 284-88.
9. 653 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Va. 1987).
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1985 wliich stated that employment was terminable at will. After
the plaintiff was discharged, he sued Kings for breach of contract,
claiming that the 1980 manual served to rebut the at-will
presumption.
Ruling on Kings' motion for summary judgment, the district
court rejected the contention that the provisions contained in the
1980 manual were not enforceable terms of the plaintiff's employ-
ment. The court adopted the suggestion in an earlier handbook de-
cision from the Western District of Virginia, Thompson v. Ameri-
can Motor Inns, Inc.,10 that an employee could demonstrate that a
handbook constitutes an offer of benefits in exchange for continued
labor and that acceptance is demonstrated by reading and signify-
ing that he understands the handbook's terms and conditions of
employment, and working according to those terms and condi-
tions.1" Applying this analysis, the court found that the plaintiff
had produced evidence sufficient for a finding of offer and assent
to the 1980 manual's provision for termination for cause. 2 The
court dismissed Kings' argument that the 1985 handbook con-
verted plaintiff to an at-will employee, finding that Kings had not
produced sufficient evidence to conclusively establish that the
plaintiff assented to the 1985 handbook's terms. It rejected Kings'
view that the plaintiff's acceptance should be inferred from his
continuing to work with knowledge of the 1985 handbook's terms,
concluding that inaction cannot be construed as assent under gen-
eral contract principles. 3
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has not had occasion to
review the federal district court decisions on the enforceability of
terms contained in an employment handbook. In Costantino v.
Jaycor,4 the Fourth Circuit merely noted that the trial court cor-
rectly had refused to admit in evidence an employment manual
which specified only cause and reduction in force as bases for ter-
mination of employment. The plaintiff had claimed his discharge
breached this term of employment but failed to establish that the
handbook was applicable to him as an executive employee. 5 Thus
the question of whether the handbook was evidence sufficient to
rebut the at-will presumption was not before the court.
10. 623 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Va. 1985).
11. Kings Entertainment Co., 653 F. Supp. at 874.
12. Id. at 874-75.
13. Id. at 875-76.
14. No. 86-2559 (4th Cir. April 14, 1987).
15. Id. slip op. at 4.
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Costantino, however, did address another exception to 'the at-
will employment rule which has been accepted in several other ju-
risdictions: the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of a con-
tract claim based on an implied covenant, stating:
In light of the Supreme Court of Virginia's characterization of an
employment contract of unlimited duration as 'a contract of hazard,'
Edwards Co. v. Deihl, we are not satisfied that Virginia would recog-
nize a covenant of good faith and fair dealing if the court were
squarely presented with the issue today.18
II. FAIR EMPLOYMENT LAWS
The General Assembly passed Virginia's first comprehensive
anti-discrimination bill in the 1987 session. The Human Rights Act
makes unlawful any discrimination on the basis of race, color, reli-
gion, national origin, sex, age, marital status or disability, in em-
ployment as well as in public accomodations, including educational
institutions, and in real estate transactions. Prior to enactment of
the Human Rights Act, Virginia law only addressed private sector
employment discrimination on the basis of disability.'8
A major feature of the legislation is the creation of the Council
on Human Rights, which is authorized to receive, investigate, seek
to conciliate, hold hearings and make findings and recommenda-
tions upon complaints alleging unlawful discriminatory practices."9
An unlawful discriminatory practice is defined as conduct which
violates Virginia antidiscrimination statutes or regulations, title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,20 or the Fair Labor Standards
Act.2'
16. Id. slip op. at 6 (citation omitted).
17. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-714 to -725 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
18. See Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 51.01-40 to -46 (Cum.
Supp. 1986) (amended 1987). The Virginia Fair Employment Contracting Act of 1980 re-
quires that state contracts of over ten thousand dollars shall contain provisions requiring
the contractor to agree not to discriminate on the basis of race, religion, color, sex, or na-
tional origin during the performance of the contract. Id. § 2.1-376 (Repl. Vol. 1987). No
penalties or enforcement procedures are provided, however.
19. Id. §§ 2.1-718 to -720 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000h-6 (1982).
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 - 262 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Specifically, the Equal Pay Act provi-
sions of the Fair Labor Standards Act prohibiting sex-based discrimination in payment of
772 [Vol. 21:769
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The Council's investigatory role is triggered by the filing of a
written complaint within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory
event.22 In carrying out its investigation, the Council must rely
upon the cooperation of the parties to obtain information; the
Council itself does not have power to issue subpoenas. It may,
however, request the Attorney General to apply to a circuit judge
for a subpoena duces tecum after it has made a good faith effort to
obtain information necessary to determine whether a violation has
occurred.23
If the alleged discriminatory practice is unlawful under a Vir-
ginia statute which is enforced by a state agency, the Council must
refer the complaint to the agency.24 The Council does not have ju-
risdiction over complaints filed under local ordinances prohibiting
discrimination. 5
The Council's authority does not extend to awarding damages or
granting injunctive relief; it is limited to resolving complaints
through conciliation. If conciliation efforts are unsuccessful, an un-
solved complaint must be referred to the federal agency with
jurisidiction over the complaint.2"
The Act explicitly provides that the Human Rights Act does not
create an independent or private cause of action, nor should it be
construed to allow tort actions for unlawful discrimination.2 7 Lack-
ing such an explicit pronouncement by the legislature, it might
have been argued that a cause of action in tort existed for dis-
charging an employee in violation of the public policy embodied in
the Act. This provision, therefore, was inserted to discourage a new
wages for equal work are incorporated in the definition of an unlawful discriminatory prac-
tice. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982).
22. The General Assembly adopted the title VII limitations period for filing a charge of
discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982).
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-721 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
24. Id. § 2.1-717.
25. Id. The 1987 General Assembly gave Virginia cities, towns, and counties the authority
to enact human rights ordinances prohibiting discrimination in employment, as well as
housing, public accommodations, credit, and education. The ordinances cannot be inconsis-
tent with nor more stringent than applicable state laws. The new law also permits localities
to establish a local commission on human rights with powers and duties granted by the
Human Rights Act. See id. § 15.1-37.3:8 (Cum. Supp. 1987). Local human rights agencies
which were established before July 1, 1987, may continue to exercise additional powers
which previously had been granted them. See id. § 2.1-724 (Repl. Vol. 1987). Thus, the City
of Alexandria and County of Fairfax human relations commissions may continue to operate
as deferral agencies as certified by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
26. Id. § 2.1-717 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
27. Id. § 2.1-725.
7731987]
774 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:769
exception to the employment-at-will rule under the Virginia Su-
preme Court's holding in Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville."
28. 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985).
